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DUE PROCESS AND PAROLB REVOCATION: PROMPT HEARINGS FOR
INCARCERATED PAROLEES
Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975)
Petitioners were convicted and reincarcerated' for federal offenses
committed while they were on parole. The United States Board of
Parole issued parole violator warrants,' which were lodged as detainerss
with the director of the penal institution in which petitioners were
confined. Execution of the warrants4 and revocation hearings' were to
be deferred until the expiration of the intervening sentences. Each
petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus,0 claiming that the parole
1. All three petitioners had earlier been convicted and incarcerated for federal of-
fenses. Whittaker and Beshers had been released on parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
4203 (1970), providing for release on parole when, in the discretion of the parole board,
"there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and remain at liberty with-
out violating the laws [and] such release is not incompatible with the welfare of society
.... Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1083 (8th Cir. 1975). Cleveland had
been mandatorily released in accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4164 (1970), which provides
that a
prisoner having served his term or terms less good-time deductions shall,
upon release, be deemed as if released on parole until the maximum term
or terms for which he was sentenced less one hundred and eight days.
Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1975).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1970):
A warrant for the retaking of any United States prisoner who has violated
his parole, may be issued only by the Board of Parole or a member thereof and
within the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced. The unex-
pired term of imprisonment of any such prisoner shall begin to run from the
date he is returned to the custody of the Attorney General under said warrant,
and the time the prisoner was on parole shall not diminish the time he was
sentenced to serve.
3. A detainer serves to notify the prisoner's custodian that the prisoner is wanted
in the jurisdiction issuing the detainer. See notes 31 & 43 infra and accompanying text.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1970) provides that a federal officer shall "execute such
[violator] warrant by taking such prisoner and returning him to the custody of the At-
torney General."
5. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1970):
A prisoner retaken upon a warrant issued by the Board of Parole, shall be
given an opportunity to appear before the Board, a member thereof, or an ex-
aminer designated by the Board.
The Board may then or at any time in its discretion, revoke the order of pa-
role and terminate such parole or modify the terms and conditions thereof.
If such order of parole shall be revoked and the parole so terminated, the
said prisoner may be required to serve all or any part of the remainder of the
term for which he was sentenced.
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1970). Cleveland sought a prompt revocation hearing,
while Whittaker and Beshers requested that the parole violator warrants be quashed. See
notes 10 & 41 infra.
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board's failure to execute the warrants and afford prompt revocation
hearings constituted a denial of due process. 7 The federal district court
ordered the parole board to execute the warrants and grant parole
revocation hearings "with reasonable dispatch." On appeal, 9 the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed and held: The due process
clause of the fifth amendment requires that a federal parole violation
warrant lodged as a detainer against a parolee incarcerated for a subse-
quent offense must be executed promptly and a parole revocation hear-
ing held within a reasonable time thereafter. 10
Until recently, courts uniformly refused to find the due process clause
applicable to parole revocation proceedings." The decisions were
7. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
8. 517 F.2d at 1084. The district court refused to quash the warrants. Id. at
1085.
9. Respondent Ciccone, director of the United States Medical Center for Federal
Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, appealed the district court judgment ordering him to
execute the parole violator warrants. Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1084 (8th
Cir. 1975). Whittaker and Beshers appealed from the judgment of the court refusing
to quash the warrants. Id. at 1085.
10. Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975). The court refused to
quash the warrants because the decision imposed a previously unrecognized constitu-
tional obligation upon the parole board. Additionally, there was no showing of severe
prejudice or "invidious or purposeful interference by respondents with the due process
rights of the class members ...... Id. at 1089. The court emphasized, however, that
future delays would be "measured in consonance with notice of our holding today." Id.
Other courts have found delays unreasonable and quashed warrants. E.g. United States
ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975) (refusing to quash warrant would
grant a right without a remedy); Arnold v. United States Bd. of Parole, 390 F. Supp.
1177, 1179-80 (D.D.C. 1975); Wells v. Wise, 390 F. Supp. 229, 231 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889, 898 (D.D.C. 1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F.
Supp. 571, 574 (D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 366
F. Supp. 270, 272-73 (D.D.C. 1973). See also Gay v. United States Bd. of Parole, 394
F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Va. 1975); Peele v. Sigler, 392 F. Supp. 325, 327 (E.D. Wash.
1974) (parole board given 15 days to hold hearing).
11. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S.
471 (1972); Allen v. Perini, 424 F.2d 134 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 906 (1970);
Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969); Eason v. Dickson, 390 F.2d 585
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968); Richardson v. Markley, 339 F.2d 967
(7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 851 (1965); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). But see Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d
1090 (4th Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 972 (1972); United States
ex iel. Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole, 443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as
moot. 404 U.S. 879 (1971); Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403, 409 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971) (dictum).
Some federal courts construing 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (1970), quoted in note 5 supra,
found a statutory right to a hearing. See, e.g., Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.
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based on deference to the discretion of the parole boards"2 mandated by
several theories of parolee status. Under the "grace" theory,1 parole
was deemed an act of grace by a benevolent sovereign who retained the
power to revoke the privilege at will. Under the "constructive custody"
theory,' 4 a parolee was viewed as continuing to serve his sentence
1963) (parole revocation hearings must be held as promptly as possible); Reed v. But-
terworth, 297 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (parolee released due to unreasonable delay
in granting revocation hearing); United States ex tel. Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d 534
(2d Cir. 1961) (revocation hearing must be held within reasonable time after parolee
is taken into custody). See also Robbins v. Reed, 269 F.2d 242 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Moore v. Reid, 246 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 (D.C.
Cir. 1946); United States ex tel Hitchcock v. Kenton, 256 F. Supp. 296 (D. Conn.
1966); United States ex tel. Vance v. Kenton, 252 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1966); Hol-
liday v. Settle, 218 F. Supp. 738 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
For discussions of state and federal parole revocation procedures, see Cohen, Due
Process, Equal Protection and State Parole Revocation Proceedings, 42 U. COLO. L.
REv., 197 (1970) (state); Sklaar, Law and Practice in Probation and Parole Revocation
Hearings, 55 J. Cium. L.C. & P.S. 175 (1964) (state and federal); Note, Parole Re-
vocation in the Federal System, 56 GEO. LJ. 705 (1968); Note, Parole: A Critique
of its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 702, 702-13 (1963) (fed-
eral).
12. See, e.g., Cook v. United States Attorney Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974); Adams v. United States, 432 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1970);
Smith v. United States, 409 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1968); Brest v. Ciccone, 371 F.2d 981
(8th Cir. 1967) (Board has absolute discretion in matters of parole). But see Burton
v. Ciccone, 484 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1973) (criticizing Brest v. Ciccone, supra); Bland
v. Rodgers, 332 F. Supp. 989, 992-93 (D.D.C. 1972) (discretion limited by "paramount
federal constitutional or statutory rights"). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539
(1974); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Pa-
role Release Decisions, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1518, 1521-24 (1972); Note, Decency and
Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57 VA. L. Ray. 841 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 494 (1935); Morrissey v. Brewer, 443
F.2d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d
91, 93 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Brown v. Kearney, 355 F.2d 199,
200 (5th Cir. 1966); Hiatt v. Compagna, 178 F.2d 42, 45 (5th Cir. 1949).
14. See, e.g., Anderson v. Coral], 263 U.S. 193, 196 (1923); Morrissey v. Brewer,
443 F.2d 942, 947 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Padilla v. Lynch, 398
F.2d 481, 482 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 928 (1967); Doherty v. United
States, 280 F.2d 35, 37 (9th Cir. 1960); Jenkins v. Madigan, 211 F.2d 904, 906 (7th
Cir. 1954).
Courts relied upon three other theories less frequently. Under the contract theory,
a parolee was deemed to have obtained his liberty in exchange for a binding agreement
to abide by the conditions of parole. See, e.g., United States ex tel. Randazzo v. Fol-
lette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 15-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971); Ex parte Edwards, 78 Okla. Crim. 213, 219-20, 146
P.2d 311, 314 (1944). The "exhaustion of rights" theory held that the parolee ex-
pended all of his rights at his criminal trial. Since this theory considered parole revoca-
tion to be part of the prison system, rather than an aspect of the sentencing process,
summary deprivation was permissible. See, e.g., Morrisey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942, 948
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beyond the prison walls under the custody of the warden, subject to
recall at any time. These theories, founded on the notion that "rights"
but not "privileges" were protected by the due process clause, 15 were
undermined 6 by a series of Supreme Court decisions that expanded the
scope of the liberty and property protected by the due process clause.' 7
In Morrissey v. Brewer'8 the Supreme Court held that limited 9 due
process must be afforded at parole revocation proceedings.
In Morrissey, the Court reasoned that due process must be afforded
whenever an individual may suffer a "grievous loss' '2° because of gov-
(8th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). By analogy to the doctrine of parens pa-
triae. the relationship of parole board and parolee was deemed to resemble that of par-
ent and child. Because the parole board was acting for the benefit of the parolee, pro-
cedural safeguards were unnecessary. See, e.g., Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403,
407 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023 (1971), quoting Hyser v. Reed, 318
F.2d 225, 237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963). For a discussion of
these theories, see Note, Parole Revocation in the Federal System, supra note 11; Note,
Parole: A Critique of its Legal Foundations and Conditions, supra note 11, at 702-13;
Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 284-300 (1971). Note, Free-
dom and Rehabilitation in Parole Revocation Hearings, 72 YALE L.J. 368, 382 (1962).
15. On the right-privilege distinction, see Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. R.v. 1439, 1439-45 (19658).
Judicial refusal to afford due process at parole revocation proceedings has been the sub-
ject of academic criticism. See, e.g., Note, Parole: A Critique of its Legal Foundations
and Conditions, supra note 11, at 734 (obstructs "primary goal of rehabilitation"); Com-
ment, The Parole System, supra note 14, at 282-293 (parole theories unrealistic, illogi-
cal, inconsistent, and tend to paralyze the courts).
16. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971) (concept that con-
stitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a right
or as a privilege has been rejected); Van Alstyne, supra note 15.
17. See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (revocation of driver's license);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits); Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (counsel must be appointed at probation revocation proceed-
ings when sentencing has been deferred at the time of the trial); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 16 (1967) (juvenile hearings); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961) (public employment). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
733 (1964); Note, The Growth of Procedural Due Process Into a New Substance: An
Expanding Protection for Personal Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property . . . In
Our Economic System," 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 502 (1971); 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 752, 753-
54.
18. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
19. "[R]evocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution and thus the full
panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revo-
cations." Id. at 480 (emphasis added). The extensive protections of the sixth amend-
ment are guaranteed only in "criminal prosecutions." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. "Parole
arises after the end of the criminal prosecution . . . . Supervision is not directly by
the court but by an administrative agency. . . ." 408 U.S. at 480.
20. Id. at 481, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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eminent action affecting "liberty" or "property" protected by the four-
teenth amendment, and that the deprivation of a parolee's conditional
liberty is such a loss. 21  The Court emphasized that "due process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands. 22 Nevertheless, the Court listed procedural safeguards
that must be provided a parolee threatened with parole revocation, in-
cluding a hearing within a reasonable time after he is taken into custody
and the opportunity to contest the charges or, when the violation is
admitted, to present mitigating evidence showing that revocation is
unwarranted.23
21. We see, therefore, that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, in-
cludes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination in-
flicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on others. It is hardly useful
any longer to try to deal with this problem in terms of whether the parolee's
liberty is a 'right' or a 'privilege.' By whatever name, the liberty is valuable
and must be seen as within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment.
408 U.S. at 482.
22. "Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what proc-
ess is due. .. . [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections
as the particular situation demands." Id. at 481. See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 263 (1970); Cafeteria Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961);
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due
Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); Parsons-
Lewis, Due Process in Parole Release Decisions, supra note 12; Tobriner & Cohen, How
Much Process is "Due" Parolees and Prisoners, 25 HASTINGs L.J 801 (1974).
23. 408 U.S. at 488. The Court stated that a "lapse of two months. . . would not
appear to be unreasonable." Id. Other required safeguards included a preliminary hear-
ing (in the character of a hearing in probable cause to determine existence of violation),
held reasonably near the place of violation and as promptly as is convenient. Id. at 485.
In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), the Court held Morrissey applicable to pro-
bation revocation proceedings. Appointed counsel was required when the alleged violation
of parole was denied or, if the violation was admitted, the parolee's case against revoca-
tion was complex or difficult to present. The Court refused to fashion precise rules, and
left determinations to be made on a case-by-case basis. 411 U.S. at 790. Cf. Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For
discussion of Morrissey and Gagnon, see Cassour, The Morrissey Maelstrom: Recent
Developments in California Parole and Probation Revocations, 9 U. SAN F.L. Rnv. 43
(1974); Cohen, A Comment on Morrissey v. Brewer: Due Process and Parole Revoca-
tion, 8 CiuM. L. BULL. 616 (1972); Fisher, Parole and Probation Revocation Proceed-
ings After Morrissey and Gagnon, 65 J. CRiM. L. 46 (1974); Lowenstein, Accelerating
Change in Correctional Law, 7 CLEAIUNGHOUSE REv. 528 (1974); Note, Probation and
Parole: The Right to an Attorney at Revocation Hearings: Are We Dragging Our Feet
Toward Due Process and Equal Protection?, 24 OKLA. L. Rav. 279 (1974); 6 CoNx.
L. REv. 558 (1974) (criticizing Gagnon as a poor compromise between courts that had
interpreted Mempa as requiring appointed counsel at all revocation hearings and those
holding that Mempa should be limited to its facts); 24 SYRAcUsE L. R-Ev. 831 (1971)
(criticizing Morrissey for leaving parole board in control of the proceedings and for con-
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Since the parolees in Morrissey were at liberty at the time of revoca-
tion, the Morrissey holding is not directly applicable to parolees who
have already been deprived of their conditional liberty by incarceration
for subsequent offenses. 24  The Supreme Court by implication cast
doubt on this incarceration distinotion in Wolff v. McDonnell25 when it
held that due process must be afforded in prison disciplinary proceed-
ings.26 The Court found that the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth
amendment encompassed a prisoner's interest in the "good time!'27
jeopardized by such proceedings, and that due process is required even
though the loss of "good time" is less "grievous" than revocation of
parole. 21
When a federal parolee is incarcerated for a subsequent offense,29 the
United States Board of Parole issues a violator's warrant and lodges it as
tinuing state's discretionary power over the parolee). For a discussion of federal parole
and probation procedures, see Fisher, supra; Annot., 36 L. ED. 2d 1077 (1974).
24. There were no criminal charges lodged against the petitioners in Morrissey.
Among the alleged parole violations were operating a motor vehicle without permission,
obtaining a drivers license and credit under an assumed name, and disregarding terri-
torial restrictions without permission. 408 U.S. at 473-74. For a discussion of restric-
tions that may be placed on parolees, see Comment, The Parole System, supra note 14,
at 285. Incarcerated parolees no longer enjoy the conditional liberty the loss of which
prompted the Court in Morrissey to require due process in parole revocation proceed-
ings.
25. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
26. See notes 64-69 infra and accompanying text. Although the Court in Wolff did
not state that it was extending the holding in Morrissey and drew a distinction between
loss of good time and parole revocation, it is clear that the primary reason for the re-
fusal to hold Morrissey applicable in full was the desire to avoid prison violence. The
Court concluded that procedures which might endanger prison officials or other inmates
need not be afforded. Id. at 561. Justices Douglas and Marshall, objected strenuously
to the majority's refusal to apply Morrissey in full. Id. at 581, 593.
While the Wolff Court declined to grant prisoners the full array of Morrissey
rights, the crux of Wolff is its application of due process and the principles underlying
Morrissey to situations in which the interests involved and the loss threatened are not
comparable to the revocation of a parolee's conditional liberty. This loss of conditional
liberty prompted the application of due process in Morrissey. The Wolff Court's will-
ingness to find the due process clause applicable to less grievous losses was thus a sig-
nificant extension of the principals underlying Morrissey.
27. Id. at 558.
28. Id. at 560-61. For a discussion of the erosion of the judicial "hands off" policy
towards prison proceedings see Note, Decency and Fairness: An Emerging Judicial Role
in Prison Reform, supra note 12.
29. Where a parolee has been convicted of an offense that constitutes a violation
of parole, a preliminary hearing is unnecessary because the fact of violation has already
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a detainer with the prisoner's custodian. 0 The detainer is a request that
the custodian notify the parole board before releasing the prisoner.3 1
Execution of the warrant and a revocation hearing are usually delayed
until the intervening sentence has been served. 2 Since the unexpired
portion of the original sentence does not begin to run until the warrant is
executed,3 3 the parole board in effect imposes a consecutive sentence as
a penalty for the violation of parole. 4 If the warrant were promptly
executed, the parolee would automatically receive concurrent sen-
tences.3 5
Prior to Wolff, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth3" and Tenth 37
30. 28 C.F.R. § 2.53 (1975), provides:
(a) In those instances where the prisoner is serving a new sentence in an
institution, the warrant may be placed there as a detainer. Such prisoner shall
be advised that he may communicate with the Board relative to disposition of
the warrant, and may request that it be withdrawn or executed so his violator
term will run concurrently with the new sentence. Should further information
be deemed necessary, the Regional Director may designate a hearing examiner
panel to conduct a dispositional interview at the institution where the prisoner
is confined ....
(b) Following the dispositional review the Regional Director may:
(1) Let the detainer stand
(2) Withdraw the detainer and close the case if the expiration date has
passed;
(3) Withdraw the detainer and reinstate to supervision; thus permitting the
federal sentence time to run uninterruptedly from the time of his original re-
lease on parole or mandatory release.(4) Execute warrant, thus permitting the sentence to run from that point in
time. If the warrant is executed, a previously conducted dispositional inter-
view may be construed as a revocation hearing.
31. The underlying reason for detainers is the inability of one jurisdiction to compel
another to surrender a prisoner. A detainer is not binding upon a custodial state but
is usually honored as a matter of comity. It has been estimated that as many as thirty
percent of all federal prisoners have at least one detainer lodged against them, less than
one-half of which are ever exercised. Shelton, Unconstitutional Uncertainty: A Study
of the Use of Detainers, 1 PRospEcrus 119, 120 (1968). See generally Bennet, The
Last Full Ounce, 23 FED. PROBATION 20, 21 (1950); Dauber, Reforming the Detainer
System: A Case Study, 7 CRam. L. BuLL. 669 (1971); Wexler & Hershey, Criminal De-
tainers in a Nutshell, 7 CIMs. L. BuLL. 753 (1971); Note, Detainers and the Correc-
tional Process, 1966 WAsH. U.L.Q. 417; note 43 infra.
32. RuLEs OF Tim UNTED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, 34,35 (1971):
The prisoner will ordinarily be required to serve the period of [the interven-
ing] sentence before the hearing is held . . . and his violator time will be
served consecutively to the new sentence.
33. See 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1970), quoted in note 2 supra; 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (1970)
quoted in note 4 supra.
34. See note 32 supra.
35. See Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 1975).
36. See Cook v. United States Attorney Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 846 (1974). See also Trimmings v. Henderson, 498 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1974),
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Circuits held that the board's policy of delay did not violate due
process."' They reasoned that only parolees "in custody" for the pur-
poses of the federal parole statute are entitled to a Morrissey hearing.
Formal execution of a violator warrant was deemed a prerequisite to
custody.39 The two courts held a prompt hearing unnecessary40 despite
the unfairness of a delayed hearing4 and the intervening subjection of
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975); Burnett v. United States Bd. of Parole, 491 F.2d 966
(5th Cir. 1974).
37. See Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974).
38. Prior to Morrissey, the practice of delaying execution of warrants and revoca-
tion hearings was universally upheld. E.g., Cox v. Feldkamp, 438 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.
1971); Hash v. Henderson, 385 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1967); Maples v. United States, 360
F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1966); Saylor v. United States Bd. of Parole, 345 F.2d 100 (D.C.
Cir. 1965); Avellino v. United States, 330 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1964); Wiesenthal v.
United States, 322 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1963).
Two cases decided after Wolff adopted the reasoning of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
and upheld the constitutionality of the parole board's policy of delay. See Gaddy v.
Michael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975) (failing to recognize Wolff); Gray v. Hogan,
388 F. Supp. 476 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (attempting to distinguish Wolff). But see notes
49 & 65 infra.
39. See Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1974); Cook v. United States
Attorney Gen., 488 F.2d 667, 671 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974). In
Cook, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the warrant had been technically exe-
cuted when it had been lodged as a detainer. Under the statute, execution triggers cus-
tody, see note 4 supra. These courts found that the parolee was merely in custody for
the intervening charge and not for the parole violation.
40. The Tenth Circuit found that although a violator warrant must be executed
within a reasonable time after issuance, incarceration for a subsequent offense justified
delay. Small v. Britton, 500 F.2d 299, 300 (10th Cir. 1974). See also Gaddy v. Mi-
chael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975). In Small neither the court nor any of the cases
cited offered any explanation for permitting this exception. In Gaddy, the Fourth Cir-
cuit unconvincingly explained that the justification for delaying execution of parole vio-
lator warrants was "founded primarily on fairness to the parolee . . . ." 519 F.2d at
647. The crux of the Fourth Circuit's position is that an earlier decision would more
likely result in revocation than a decision made at the end of the intervening sentence.
In Morrissey, however, the Supreme Court rejected the state's contention that requir-
ing due process at parole revocations would lead to fewer grants of parole. 408 U.S.
at 483. Additionally, the only authority cited by the Fourth Circuit, Noorlander v.
United States Attorney Gen., 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938
(1973), was effectively overruled by Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082, 1087 (8th
Cir. 1975). It is difficult to understand how this practice promotes "fairness to the pa-
rolee" when it deprives the parolee of prison privileges, bars any opportunity for parole,
impairs the rehabilitation process, and precludes the effective presentation of mitigating
evidence at the revocation hearing. See note 43 infra.
41. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits acknowledged that a revocation hearing is re-
quired under Morrissey once the warrant is executed. This delayed hearing is of ques-
tionable value because it may take place years after the occurrence. See, e.g., Small v.
Britton, 500 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974) (three years); Cook v. United States Attorney
Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974) (six years); Smith
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the parolee to the punitive effects of a detainer.42
The lodging of a detainer, which frequently results in deprivation of
prison privileges and more restrictive confinement, impairs the rehabili-
tation process. 43 In Cooper v. Lockhart,44 the Eighth Circuit held that a
v. Blackwell, 367 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1966) (seven years). In Small, as in Cook, the
court emphasized that the parolees had failed to demonstrate that the long delay had
prejudiced either their ability to present favorable evidence or their right to a fair hear-
ing. 500 F.2d at 302; 488 F.2d at 673. See also Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th
Cir. 1975). Unless evidence was lost or witnesses became unavailable, it is unlikely
that a parolee could demonstrate how a delay had prejudiced him. While he might ar-
gue that his memory had faded, this argument would probably be rejected by both courts.
Also, petitioners in Small and Cook requested cancellation of the charges rather than
a revocation hearing. The remedy requested may have influenced the courts' holdings.
Cf. Menechino v. Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023
(1971), construed in United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman of New York State Bd.
of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), dismissed as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974), noted in
1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 752, 755-57. This was clearly the case in Gaddy v. Michael, 519
F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975) in which petitioner made no attempt to secure a hearing while
incarcerated and simply sought cancellation of the warrant at the end of the intervening
sentence. The Fourth Circuit found that petitioner's failure to protest seriously im-
paired his credibility. Id. at 678.
42. In Cook, the disadvantages of a detainer were deemed to be not so severe or
so unrelated to the reason for the very existence of a detainer as to require that a hear-
ing be granted early in the intervening sentence. 488 F.2d at 672. But see note 43
infra.
43. The inmate may be assigned to maximum security or become ineligible for work
release programs, trustyships, and parole. See Cooper v. Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 313
(8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Candelaria, 131 F. Supp. 797, 806 (S.D. Cal. 1955),
quoting HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL (1947):
The prison administrator is thwarted in his efforts toward rehabilitation. The
inmate who has a detainer lodged against him is filled with anxiety and appre-
hension and frequently does not respond to a training program. He often must
be kept in close custody which bars him from treatment such as trustyships,
moderation of custody and opportunity for transfer to farms and work camps.
[M-e often becomes embittered with institutionalization and the objective
of the correctional system is defeated.
Critics maintain that detainers rest upon the irrational and impermissible assumptions
that a prisoner subject to a detainer is guilty of the underlying charges and that he is
a serious escape risk. They point out that detainers are filed at the whim of a prosecu-
tor, often for purposes of harassment, and that a prisoner charged with a crime in an-
other jurisdiction is hardly a more serious escape risk than a prisoner serving a long
sentence in the custodial jurisdiction. See Cooper v. Lockhart, supra; COUNCIL OF STATE
GovERNmENTs, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 93 (rev. ed. 1966) (Inter-
state Agreement on Detainers); note 31 supra.
The disruptive and unjust effects of detainers are recognized in the Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers, which is designed to provide for the speedy resolution of outstanding
charges underlying detainers. The Agreement applies only to prisoners awaiting and re-
questing a trial in another jurisdiction, not to those who await parole or probation re-
vocation hearings. Parole and probation detainers, however, generally remain outstand-
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parolee incarcerated for a subsequent offense was denied due process
when the custodial state continued to subject him to the effects of a
detainer lodged by another state that refused to conduct a parole revoca-
tion hearing. 45 The court determined that the parolee was entitled to a
hearing under Morrissey, notwithstanding incarceration for a subse-
quent offense.46 Having no jurisdiction over the state that requested the
iag longer than those affected by the Agreement, with identical debilitating effects upon
the prisoner. Although detainers are still honored only as a matter of comity by a cus-
todial state, the Agreement itself is binding upon the parties to it. To date, thirty-seven
states and the federal government have adopted the Agreement. For discussion and cri-
ticism of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, see sources cited note 31 supra.
44. 489 F.2d 308 (8th Cir. 1973).
45. Id. at 315.
46. The court found that the loss of any opportunity for concurrent sentences, the
effects of the detainer, and the likelihood that a delayed hearing would be unfair ren-
dered an early hearing a constitutional necessity under Morrissey. The court relied
heavily upon Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969). In Smith, a sixth amendment case,
the Supreme Court held that a prisoner in one state is entitled to a speedy trial on
charges brought by another state which requests that a detainer be lodged against him.
The Court reasoned that delaying the trial deprived the prisoner of any opportunity to
serve concurrent sentences, impaired his ability to defend himself at trial, continued the
unjustified effects of the detainer, and caused uncertainty and anxiety that reduced the
prisoner's chances of rehabilitation. The Cooper court astutely recognized that although
the sixth amendment is inapplicable to parole revocations, this factor
does not mean that the due process clause rejects a prompt and timely hearing
in other procedures, formal or informal. Dim memories and disappearance of
witnesses can well affect the outcome of a parole revocation hearing as much
as any criminal trial. Delay in any procedure may well affect its fundamental
fairness.
489 F.2d at 312-13.
The Cooper court thus found that the parolee was entitled to a prompt parole revoca-
tion hearing. The custodial state, by taking him into custody, honoring the detainer,
and subjecting him to the effects of the detainer, acted as agent for the parole state.
To support this reasoning, the court relied on Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct., 410 U.S.
484 (1973), a landmark habeas corpus case. The federal habeas corpus statute
requires that a prisoner be "in custody" before he can seek habeas corpus relief. 28
U.S.C. § 2241(c) (3) (1970). Under the prematurity doctrine, enunciated in McNally
v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), a prisoner serving the first of consecutive sentences was
deemed to be in custody only under the first. In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968),
the court overruled McNally, holding that for the purposes of the federal habeas corpus
statute a prisoner serving the first of two consecutive sentences was in custody for both.
Among the reasons given in Peyton were those offered by the Eighth Circuit in Cleve-
land: that dim memories and the loss of witnesses and evidence precluded a fair hear-
ing. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 62 (1968); Cleveland v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 1082,
1086 (8th Cir. 1975).
Peyton was extended in Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct., supra, which held that a
prisoner could challenge a future sentence or a detainer lodged against him by another
state. 'The state holding the prisoner in immediate confinement acts as the agent for
the demanding state." 410 U.S. at 498-99. Although Braden dealt with custody under
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detainer, however, the court could not require the parole board to grant
a hearing and insisted only that the custodial state refuse to continue the
effects of the detainer. 47
In Cleveland v. Ciccone, 4  the Eighth Circuit was the first court of
appeals to hold the United States Board of Parole's practice unconsti-
tutional and to require a prompt revocation hearing for an incarcerated
parolee.49 The court found that conviction and incarceration for a sub-
sequent offense do not destroy a parolee's right to a hearing granted "at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 0 The hearing would
not be a mere formality since conviction for a subsequent offense does
not necessarily result in revocation."' The Eighth Circuit rejected as a
the habeas corpus statute and thus was not controlling, it was logical to apply its rea-
soning to the parole statute. To protect important constitutional rights that are endan-
gered by the use of technical definitions, courts have adopted practical definitions of
"custody" to permit liberal use of the writ of habeas corpus. See Carafas v. La Vallee,
391 U.S. 234 (1968); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1962); United States ex rel.
Meadows v. New York, 426 F.2d 1176 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 941 (1970);
Word v. North Carolina, 406 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1969); Note, Developments in the Law
of Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. RV. 1038, 1087-93 (1970). States have not
only an obligation, but an affirmative interest in dealing fairly with parolees. See, e.g.,
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972). The difference between a violator war-
rant lodged as a detainer and an executed one is formal. This mere formality should
not deprive a parolee of his constitutional right to a meaningful revocation hearing.
47. 489 F.2d at 315. In Cooper, because of the lack of jurisdiction, the court was
unable to order the parole state to hold a revocation hearing. The possibility that a
parolee might not receive a fair hearing in the event of a long delay, or lose the oppor-
tunity for concurrent sentences, was not precluded by the holding in that case. One
petitioner's case was dismissed as moot after he had been transferred pursuant to the
detainer. Id. at 311.
48. 517 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1975).
49. A number of district courts have held the parole board policy unconstitu-
tional. See, e.g., Gay v. United States Bd. of Parole, 394 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Va.
1975); Wade v. United States Bd. of Parole, 392 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. Wash. 1975); Peele
v. Sigler, 392 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Wash. 1974); Arnold v. United States Bd. of Parole,
390 F. Supp. 1177 (D.D.C. 1975); Wells v. Wise, 390 F. Supp. 229 (C.D. Cal. 1975);
Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp.
889 (D.D.C. 1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland
v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole, 366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1973). In Cleveland,
the Eighth Circuit was not plagued by the jurisdictional problem of dual sovereignties
that had precluded the court in Cooper from requiring the parole board to conduct a
prompt hearing, see note 46 & 47 supra and accompanying text. The Cleveland court
therefore had jurisdiction to order the custodian, a federal parole officer, to execute the
warrant and grant a revocation hearing as agent for the parole board. The problem
of multiple sovereignties was not solved by Cleveland. Resolution is badly needed.
50. 517 F.2d at 1086.
51. Id. at 1087. Unless the Eighth Circuit unrealistically believes that the parole
board frequently fails to revoke parole, this statement contradicts the court's position
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"technical distinction" 52 the argument that the Morrissey right to a
prompt hearing does not attach until a warrant is formally executed,53
reasoning that the lodging of the warrant as a detainer amply demon-
strates the board's intention to revoke parole.54 The loss of any oppor-
tunity to serve concurrent sentences, the impact of the delay upon
rehabilitation, and the potential loss of mitigating evidence were deemed
to be significant interests of the parolee's liberty threatened by the
board's policy of delay.15
The court determined that a prompt hearing is required as a matter of
due process.5 Dispositional interviews conducted by the board in lieu
of revocation hearings do not satisfy the requirements of due process.57
Although under existing law prompt execution of violator warrants
automatically triggers concurrent sentences58 and deprives the board of
the opportunity to penalize parole violators, 59 the court concluded that
amendment of the statute, not denial of due process, was the proper
means of preserving the board's discretion. 60
that the lodging of a detainer amply demonstrates the board's intention to revoke parole.
See note 54 infra and accompanying text. Lodging the detainer merely allows the
board to postpone its decision; approximately one-half are never executed. See note 31
spra. The court still correctly required execution promptly after the warrant is lodged
as a detainer, since the inadequacy of a delayed hearing and the punitive effects of a
detainer imposed without a hearing, see notes 42 & 43 supra, constitute a denial of due
process.
52. Id. at 1087.
53. See notes 38 & 39 supra and accompanying text.
54. 517 F.2d at 1087.
55. Id. at 1086. Given the decision in Cooper, see notes 46 & 47 supra and accom-
panying text, it is surprising that the Eighth Circuit did not consider the effects of the
detainer lodged against the petitioners without a hearing in Cleveland to be among the
endangered interests of liberty, see note 43 supra and accompanying text. In Cleveland,
however, the petitioners may not have suffered appreciably because of the detainers.
56. Id. at 1083.
57. Id. at 1088-89. The court rejected the argument that dispositional interviews
were an adequate substitute for revocation hearings. The parole board, as a matter of
policy, refuses to grant an interview unless the prisoner simultaneously requests that
parole be revoked. See RuLEs OF THE UNrrED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, 34 (1971):
The violator may petition prior to the expiration of his new sentence that his
parole or mandatory release be revoked and that he be permitted to serve some
part of his violator time concurrently with his new sentence.
58. See notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
59. 517 F.2d at 1087 (8th Cir. 1975). In three pre-Wolff cases, the Eighth Circuit
upheld delaying execution of violator warrants until the expiration of the intervening
sentence in order to preserve the Board's power. See, e.g., Noorlander v. United States
Attorney Gen., 465 F.2d 1106 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 938 (1973);
Tanner v. Mosely, 441 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1971); Hash v. Henderson, 385 F.2d 475
(Sth Cir. 1967). See also Zerbst v. Kidwell, 304 U.S. 359 (1938) (leading case).
60. 517 F.2d at 1087.
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The Cleveland court properly repudiated the board's policy of de-
lay.61 The interests of an incarcerated parolee in prison privileges, re-
habilitation,62 and the opportunity to serve concurrent sentences 8
clearly fall within the Wolff definition of "liberty" protected by the due
process clause.64  A prompt hearing should be required as a matter
of due process;65 the right to be heard implies that a hearing be granted
61. Accord, United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975);
Gay v. United States Bd. of Parole, 394 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Va. 1974); Wade v. United
States Bd. of Parole, 392 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. Wash. 1975); Peele v. Sigler, 392 F. Supp.
325 (E.D. Wash. 1974); Arnold v. United States Bd. of Parole, 390 F. Supp. 1177
(D.D.C. 1975); Wells v. Wise, 390 F. Supp. 229 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Pavia v. Hogan,
386 F. Supp. 379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F. Supp. 889 (D.D.C.
1974); Jones v. Johnston, 368 F. Supp. 571 (D.D.C. 1974); Sutherland v. District of
Columbia Bd. of Parole, 366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1973).
62. See notes 43 & 46 supra and accompanying text.
63. See notes 23 & 46 supra and accompanying text. The argument accepted by
the Cleveland court, that loss of concurrent sentences is significant, appears to be
stronger in speedy trial cases, see Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969); note 46 supra,
than in cases in which a prisoner seeks a prompt parole revocation hearing. In the
former situation it is likely that the sentencing court will grant concurrent sentences.
It is not as likely that the parole board would do so in the latter instance when the
hearing is requested early in the intervening sentence. The board delays execution of
warrants and hearings to avoid concurrent sentences, the statutory consequence of execu-
tion.
The argument that loss of the opportunity to capitalize upon the anomolous statutory
grant of concurrent sentences constitutes a deprivation of "liberty" is deficient, particu-
larly in light of the Cleveland court's admission that Congress intended to allow the
parole board to penalize parole violators and that the statute should be amended. But
see United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975); Wells v. Wise,
390 F. Supp. 229 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Sutherland v. District of Columbia Bd. of Parole,
366 F. Supp. 270 (D.D.C. 1973). Cf. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
64. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
65. Although an incarcerated parolee may not suffer the "grievous loss" found by
the Court in Morrissey, his loss is sufficiently grievous to require due process under
Wolff. The courts that have required a prompt hearing, however, have relied almost
exclusively upon Morrissey. See cases cited note 49 supra. The Court in Morrissey
stated:
Control over proceedings. . . can assure that delaying tactics and other abuses
...do not occur. Obviously a parolee can not relitigate issues determined
against him in other forums as. . .when the revocation is based on conviction
of another crime.
408 U.S. 471, 490 (1972). Noting the Morrissey Court's insistence upon the right to
present mitigating evidence, and Morrissey's determination that the states have an inter-
est in treating parolees fairly, these district courts have considered this language from
Morrissey and inferred from it a requirement that hearings must be held promptly, al.
though the content may be altered where conviction forms the basis of revocation. But
see Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975), in which the Fourth Circuit, after
quoting Morrissey both incorrectly and out of context, interpreted the same statement
from Morrissey to mean that no hearing was required when revocation was based on
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"at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.' ' 66
The Eighth Circuit correctly rejected the argument that the right to a
Morrissey hearing does not attach until a warrant is executed. "[D]ue
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands." 60 For reincarcerated parolees subject to
the effects of a detainer, the purposes of the due process clause can only
be served by granting a hearing early in the intervening sentence. 8 In
permitting delay of execution of the warrant and a hearing, the Fifth
and Tenth Circuits applied the label, but not the principles, of due
process. Their position is inconsistent with Wolffs rejection of the
"notion that the prisoner's rights under Morrissey hang in suspended
animation." 69 As the Cleveland court determined, even a congressional
intent to permit the parole board to impose consecutive sentences as a
penalty for the violation of parole cannot justify this clear violation of
due process.
The Eighth Circuit did not consider other means of avoiding the
undesirable effects of the statute-for instance, by holding that the
a subsequent conviction. Id. at 676. Although the district courts' interpretation of
Morrissey is sound, a stronger argument can be made if Morrissey is coupled with Wolff.
The interests of incarcerated parolees fall within Wolff's definition of "liberty," see
Dotes 25-28 supra and accompanying text, and the loss to which they are subjected is
oufficiently "grievous," see note 20 supra and accompanying text, to require a prompt
hearing as a matter of due process.
66. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,552 (1965).
67. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See note 22 supra and accom-
panying text.
68. Even if the parolee is not deemed to be in custody for purposes of the parole
statute, a hearing should be required. The right to a hearing is constitutional, not statu-
tory. For the purposes of Morrissey, an incarcerated parolee is in custody when his cus-
todian, acting at the request of a parole board, lodges a detainer against him. See Gay
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 394 F. Supp. 1374 (E.D. Va. 1975). The agency argu-
ment presented in Cooper, see note 46 supra, is particularly convincing in a case like
Cleveland in which the custodian is a federal parole officer.
69. Pavia v. Hogan, 386 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (N.D. Ga. 1974). In his well-
reasoned opinion in Pavia, Chief Judge Edenfield maintained that Cook v. United States
Attorney Gen., 488 F.2d 667 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 846 (1974), was over-
ruled sub silentio by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Another judge in the
same district subsequently criticized Pavia, attempted to distinguish Wolff, and held that
Cook was still controlling. Gray v. Hogan, 388 F. Supp. 477 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See also
Gaddy v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975). It is clear from Small v. Britton,
500 F.2d 299, 301 (10th Cir. 1974), that the delays permitted by the Fifth and Tenth
Circuits would be impermissible if the parolee were not incarcerated. Since the constitu-
tional right of all parolees to a Morrissey hearing is not, and cannot be denied, these
courts are using the fact of incarceration to justify an otherwise unconstitutional delay.
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revocation hearing may precede execution of a violator warrant. 7° Also,
Cleveland's mandate for a prompt hearing after the warrant is issued
and lodged as a detainer can be avoided if the parole board simply
delays issuance.71 This evasion would be impossible had the Eighth
Circuit required a parole revocation hearing within a reasonable time
after the board received notice of a criminal conviction.72
The Cleveland decision called for legislative amendment and created
a sharp conflict among the circuits. Unless other courts adopt the
position of the Eighth Circuit73 the Supreme Court will need to resolve
the issue. Cleveland is a logical and practical step beyond Morrissey
and is consistent with Wolff. It is probable that its conclusions will
ultimately prevail.
70. See United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975). Al-
though the result in Hahn mitigates the need for legislative amendment, the Seventh Cir-
cuit failed to discuss adequately the custody issue produced by the interrelation of Mor-
rissey and the federal parole statutes. In holding that the revocation hearing may pre-
cede execution of the warrant, the Hahn court seems to have implicitly accepted the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits' distinction between an issued and an executed warrant. Since
the essence of that distinction is that a parolee is not in custody until the warrant is
executed, the Seventh Circuit in effect held that a prompt hearing must be granted even
if a parolee has not been taken into custody. If, on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit
intended to hold that the parolee is in custody for the purposes of Morrissey, but not
the federal parole statute, its position is stronger and arguably preferrable to legislative
amendment. The Eighth Circuit in Cleveland declared that the problem produced by
the dual use of the word "custody" could be no longer endured. If a parolee is in cus-
tody, then the warrant must be executed regardless of the statutory effects. Legislative
clarity in the area of parole revocation is desperately needed and long overdue, see notes
14 & 15 supra and accompanying text. Although the Eighth Circuit in Cleveland did
not consider the Hahn alternative, its suggestion that amendment is required appears to
be the better solution.
71. Under 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1970), quoted in note 2 supra, a violator warrant may
be issued at any time during the original sentence.
72. See United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975). If the
hearing must be granted before the warrant is lodged as a detainer, then it is, in effect,
required before the parolee has been taken into custody regardless of what standard is
used to define custody. See note 70 supra. This alternative was not presented by either
counsel for the court's consideration.
73. Acceptance of the Eighth Circuit's position by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits is
not inconceivable since the leading decisions of those courts preceded Wolff. See
United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975). But see Gaddy
v. Michael, 519 F.2d 669 (4th Cir. 1975).
As this issue went to press, the District of Columbia Circuit "concur[red] with the
conclusion of the . . . Eighth Circuit" and reached the same result as Cleveland. Jones
v. Johnston, Civil No. 74-1424 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 23, 1976), at 45.
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